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I N T H E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PAIGE CHRISTINE FARNSWORTH,
Petitioner and Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

vs.
LOREN KELLY FARNSWORTH,
Respondent and Appellant.

Court of Appeals No.: 20110317-CA

JURISDICTION
UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) and UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(h) provide this Court with
jurisdiction over this appeal. This appeal is from the Decree of Divorce entered by the Seventh
District Court, Emery County, on March 15, 2011, the Honorable Douglas B. Thomas,
presiding.
CONSTITUTIONAL A N D STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT
OF ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL. A N D STANDARD OF REVIEW
I S S U E I:

Did the trial court appropriately determine the standard oflivingfor the Petitioner according
to that which existed during the marriage?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

In Hill v. Hill, it states that, "[we] will not upset the trial

court's apportionment of financial responsibilities in the absence of manifest injustice or
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid, 968 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1998)
citing Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156,161 (Utah App. 1989).
ISSUE II:

Did the trial court errproperly determine alimony?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review a trial court's award of alimony for an abuse of
discretion" and "will not disturb a trial court's ruling on alimony as long as the court
exercises its discretion within the bounds and under the standards we have set and has
supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions." Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App
292, TJll, 242 P.3d 787 citing Connell v. Connell. 2010 UT App 139, 1|5, 233 P.3d 836
(internal quotation marks omitted).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL A N D STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-5(3)

B.

UTAH C O D E ANN.

§30-3-5(4)

C

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-8(a)

D.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-8(b)

E.

UTAH C O D E ANN.

§30-3-8(c)

F.

UTAH C O D E ANN.

§30-3-8(d)

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE/FACTS
Paige Christine Farnsworth (hereinafter "Paige"), and Loren Kelly Farnsworth
(hereinafter "Loren"), were married on August 27, 1988. The Decree of Divorce and
accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of"Lawissued on March 15, 2011 (collectively,
the "Decree"), ended twenty-two (22) years of marriage.

The trial in this matter was held

on February 4, 2011, with the following testimony offered:
A. Testimony of Paige Farnsworth
Paige testified that around March of 2010, Loren related that he was seeking a
divorce on the grounds that their house was filthy and Paige did not do anything with him.
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Tr. at 9. Loren eventually admitted that he had started an affair at the beginning of the year.
Id. Paige then testified that Loren was engaged to Peggy, the same woman he had the affair
with, and that they had planned to get married when he sought a divorce. Id.
In filing for divorce, Loren requested that the parties' marital residence be awarded to
Paige and the minor child since there was no mortgage on the residence and such award
would decrease or replace altogether the need for alimony. Paige testified that she no longer
wanted to live in the house because of its state of disrepair. Tr. at 18-19. During their
marriage, the only repairs that had been accomplished on the house were those of necessity;
for example, Paige testified that Loren once patched the roof, but that all of their excess
money went to hunting rather than home repairs. Tr. at 19. Paige explained that she did not
have the ability to make the home repairs herself, and could not afford to hire someone to
make the repairs. Tr. at 20. Based upon an appraisal of the house at $68,000, Paige sought
an award of $34,000, or half the equity of the house. Tr. at 22.
When asked about her employment, Paige testified that she has two jobs: one with
Emery County School District as a bus driver and another with Rising Sun Quarter Horses
as a horse caretaker. Id. Paige's net income was calculated to be $1,636 per month. Tr. at 24.
After outlining Paige's income, the Court then looked at her expenses and questioned
her about the $912 mortgage payment she listed. Tr. at 25. Paige explained that this amount
was because she was looking at purchasing a home with a cost of $185,000.

The

aforementioned home that Paige wanted to buy would keep the party's minor child, Kacey's
life as unchanged as possible; she would attend the same school, ride the same bus, be in the
same church ward, and have the same situation in which to maintain her horses and

3
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livestock. Tr. at 26. Paige stated that rent in Orangeville could be as high as $600 a month,
and that she would have to pay an additional couple of hundred dollars for housing the
horses every month if she did not have horse property to house the animals. Tr. at 25-26.
Paige testified that she did qualify—though barely—for a mortgage on the home with her
income in combination with the temporary alimony she had been receiving of $1400 per
month. Tr. at 27.
Paige testified that Kacey shows horses and other animals at different competitions
every summer. Kacey joined 4H as soon as she was old enough and has shown lambs for
four (4) years. Kacey also shows her horses in Moab horse shows. Tr. at 30.
B.

Testimony of Loren Farnsworth

Loren testified that his monthly income was $7,323.33, according to the yearly
statement from 2010. Tr. at 63-64. Loren agreed that the marital residence needed many
repairs and specified that it needed new doors, windows, and that the roof needed to be
patched. Tr. at 80-81. In addition, Loren stated that Paige wrould not be able to do the repairs
herself, but would have to hire someone. Id. Loren sought to have Paige awarded the marital
residence with all of its equity, and $300 per month in alimony. Tr. at 89-90. The Court
indicated that Loren's "expectations for alimony are extremely unrealistic" based on his
monthly income.
C.

Findings of the Court

The Court awarded Paige alimony in the amount of $1,300 per month, based upon
the shortfall Paige suffered after payment of her total monthly expenses in addition to the
child support award of $712.00 per month.

This alimony award considered Paige's

4
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reasonable expenses as $710 for the mortgage, $400 for food, $200 for clothing, $550 for
transportation (maintenance, insurance and fuel costs), $250 for utilities, $45 for education,
$270 for health care premiums, $20 for health care expenses, $65 for cancer insurance, $50
for entertainment, $20 for donations, $20 for gifts, $140 for real property taxes, $36.51 for
real property insurance, $50 for real property maintenance, $125 for telephone (cell and
land), and $200 for the horses and animal feed. The Court disallowed the credit card bill
incurred post-separation. Tr. at 116-119.
Paige and Kacey were left with the dilapidated house that Loren had failed to
properly maintain, which house the trial court deemed unfit for Paige and Kacey to reside in.
The Court awarded Loren the marital residence, giving Paige her V2 interest of the total
appraised value of $68,000. Tr. at 117, 122-23. The trial court reasoned that, once the needed
repairs had been made to the marital residence in the approximate amount of $70,000, and
since the residence was worth $68,000, the marital residence would be worth $140,000. Tr.
at 128. The trial court thus afforded Paige's residence at $140,000, placing the parties on
equal ground. Id.
D.

Post-Trial.

On or about April 8, 2011, Loren filed his Notice of Appeal from the Decree. On or
about May 2, 2011, Loren filed his Docketing Statement with this Court. In that document,
Loren claimed that the trial court ordered Paige's alimony based upon a $140,000 house
without any evidence that the payment would equal the $710 per month as ordered by the
trial court. Docketing Statement at 3. Secondly, Loren argued that the trial court erroneously
included the minor child's hobby expenses into the alimony, and finally, Loren also argued

5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the trial court erroneously granted Paige a standard of living that did not exist during the
s

marriage. Id.

O n or about May 12, 2011, Paige filed her Motion for Summary Disposition (UT. K APP.
P. 10) (hereinafter "Motion"). Such document stated that the $710 was a calculation
consisting of c o m m o n knowledge and did not require evidence. Id. at 3. The Motion also
stated that Loren failed to challenge the underlying facts as found by the court supporting
the alimony award. Id. at 6.
O n or about May 3 1 , 2011, Loren filed his Appellant's Objection to Motion for Summary
Disposition (hereinafter "Objection"). Such document stated that the trial court erred in
making the determination that Paige had a "demonstrated need" for alimony and that the
trial court invented this need instead of having evidence regarding such. Objection at 3. Loren
further argued that a marshaling of the evidence on appeal would demonstrate that there was
no evidence to support that Paige had a demonstrated need for alimony corresponding to a
$140,000 house. Id. at 5.
O n or about June 9, 2011, Paige filed her Reply to Appellee's Motion for Summary
Disposition (hereinafter "Reply") with this Court. Such document stated that the trial court's
findings, including the $140,000 for Paige's house, were adequately based on Loren's actions
and such findings were well within the court's equitable powers. Reply at 2.

This Court

deferred its determination on the Motion and Reply for plenary review of the case through
briefing.
O n or about September 2, 2011, Loren filed his Brief of Appellant vnxh this Court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-5 (c)-(d) states the following:

(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living
that existed at the time of trial...
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
The trial court did nothing more than equalize the parties' standard of living based
upon its alimony award. The trial court faulted Loren for creating such a low standard of
living in the first place, particularly given his nearly $6,000 per month income, indicating that
he may have let the home fall into disrepair due to "his romantic interest in another
woman." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of"Lawat p. 5. Although Paige's initial request for an
$185,000 home was denied by the trial court, the fact that she qualified for that amount
based on her income and temporary alimony of $1,400 demonstrated that it was not such an
outrageous amount, but one that the trial court took into consideration when determining
the appropriate $140,000 amount. Loren believes the order granting Paige a mortgage on a
$140,000 home as contained in the alimony award was unfair given the historical standard he
provided to them, but such a claim fails to address the fact that the trial court equalized the
parties' respective standard of living as allowed in UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8), which
states that "(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living." The court also faulted him with the current state of
the residence and declared it was unfit for the minor child to reside in. The fact that Loren
was negligent in providing an adequate standard of living for Paige and the minor child
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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qualifies as "appropriate circumstances" for the court to equalize the parties' standards of
living.
In Bushell v. Bushelk the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
A trial judge has wide discretion in dividing property and in providing for
alimony and custody and his judgment will not be disturbed absent a showing
of an abuse of discretion. Division of property: Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d
166, 442 P.2d 928 (1968); Alimony: Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421
P.2d 503 (1966); Custody: Jorgensen v. jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979). Our
review of the record reveals ample evidence upon which the trial judge could
have based his judgment.
Ibid., 649 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1982). See also Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 U T App 373, Tf25, 993
P.2d 887 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas. 1999 U T App 239, fL6, 987 P.2d 603).
The trial court also afforded expenses of $200 per month in calculating the alimony
need to support the feeding of the family's animals. Historically the family has maintained
these animals, which expenses have always been included in their standard of living. Loren
presents a presumed future change of circumstances to this Court which may not actually
occur. When the minor child attends college, if the animals become the child's responsibility
rather than Paige's then Loren could petition the trial court for a change of alimony on that
basis. He cannot now seek such change in the award based upon a set of circumstances that
may or may not occur.

Thus, the $200 per month included in Paige's expenses was not

erroneous.
Additionally, alimony is afforded based upon the need of the individual so as to
equalize the standards of living. While Loren takes much issue with the $200 per m o n t h
expense for the family pets, he has not actually disputed that this is an unnecessary expense
to be included in the totality of the calculation of Paige's expenses. Likewise, the alimony is

8
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to cover the shortfall for Paige rather than specifically affording Loren to pay certain
particular expenses on her behalf. No inflation is accounted for over the duration of the 22years ordered for alimony payments; however, such payment will remain unchanged during
that time while Paige's expenses will necessarily increase. Loren has failed to take into
consideration the totality of the expenses afforded Paige in his challenge to one factor.
ARGUMENT
I. T H E TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED PRECEDENT I N T H E WAY IT
DETERMINED ALIMONY.
In Loren's brief he first argues that the trial court erred in giving Paige a higher
standard of living than was enjoyed during the marriage and that the house they resided in
for nearly the entire marriage had established the parties' standard of living and such
standard should have been relied upon by the court in determining alimony and housing for
the parties. Brief of Appellant at p. 7. However, Loren fails to indicate that the trial court also
found the house was unfit for the parties' minor child to reside in. It also found he was
responsible for the state of disrepair, and that once he made the necessary repairs he would
be on equal footing with Paige. Thus, he is mistaken in this argument.
In ASC Utah, Inc.. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L C the Utah Supreme Court has
recently stated the following:
[L]ong standing precedent "should not be overruled except for the most
compelling reasons." Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1982). Any
party asking a court "to overturn prior precedent ha[s] a substantial burden of
persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis." State v.
Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).
Ibid., 2010 UT 65,1f25, 245 P.3d 184. In BusheU v. BusheU. the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that, "[t]he basic rule as to division of property between spouses is that the court
9
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should make such order in relation to the property as may be equitable." Ibid., 649 P.2d 85,
87 (Utah 1982), citing Hamilton v. Hamilton. 562 P.2d 235 ( Utah 1977). In Jensen v. Jensen
this Court states the following:
In addition, trial courts must be mindful of the primary purposes of alimony:
"(1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same standard of living that
existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of each
party; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public
charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, \I, 611 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,
201P.3d 942, 2008 WL 3835161 (citations omitted).
Ibid., 2008 UT App. 392, f>, 197 P.3d 117. Furthermore, UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5 (c)-(d)
states the following:
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living
that existed at the time of trial...
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties'respective standards of living.
In Reese v. Reese, the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
With respect to the court of appeals' power to make equitable decisions in
domestic relations matters, the court of appeals is not entitled to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court except in the extraordinary circumstance of
a "manifest injustice." See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 233-34 (Utah 1997).
Ibid, 1999 UT 75, T[10, 984 P.2d 987.
To attain the goals articulated in Jensen supra, "the trial court must consider (1) the
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse
to support him or herself, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support."
Brienholt v. Brieinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App 1995), citing Jones v. Jones. 200 P.2d
1072, 1075 ttWWquoting English v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). Breinholt was
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remanded only on the absence altogether of any findings by the trial court regarding the
reasonableness of expenses. Id. The Breinholt court determined that it would only reverse if
the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings on the three (3) enumerated factors, and only
if the appellate record was devoid of relevant facts that were '"clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" Id., citing Howell v. Howell,
806 P.2d 1209, 1213(Utah App. \99\)(quoting Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 476, 478
(Utah App. 1988).

The calculation of alimony has been considered reasonable when

adequately explained by the trial court by taking the receiving spouses' monthly expenses and
subtracting the gross income of the receiving spouse and the child support award. Rehn v.
Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 1f8, 974 P.2d 306.
In Christiansen v. Christiansen, regarding demonstrated need, this Court has stated
the following:
[T]he spouse's demonstrated need must ... constitute the maximum
permissible alimony award." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah
Ct.App.1994). The trial court in this case made an implicit finding that Wife's
expenses were reasonable. To wit, the findings of fact state that Wife "needs
about $2,100 per month in addition to her own take home income in order to
make ends meet." While the court attempted to raise Wife's standard of living
to that which the parties enjoyed during the marriage, it stated that Husband
could not expect to maintain the standard he enjoyed because it included
extravagant trips with a mistress and other expenditures related to his
extramarital affair. At the same time, Wife lived in a one-bedroom
condominium with the parties' four children.
Ibid., 2003 UT App 348, 2003 WL 22361312.
As threshold to this issue, it is important to note that Loren takes issue with Paige's
"need" for a certain size house and erroneously attempts to place this under the "need"
factor articulated under Jones requiring a court to look to "the financial conditions and
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needs of the receiving spouse." Breinholt at 880, citing Jones at 1075. However, a clear
reading of the "need" factor indicates an overall financial condition or need rather than a
look to individual factors piecemealed out. The "need" is more of a totality circumstance
evidencing an "overall" need, neither specific to any one factor nor subject to reversal on
challenge to a single factor. The trial court adequately explained its calculations. Rehn at ^[8.
Additionally, the appellate record contains relevant facts that were "'clear, uncontroverted,
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" Breinholt at 880, citing
Howell at \2\Mquoting Andersen at 478.
Utah case law consistently demonstrates that it is within the right of a trial court to
seek "to equalize the standards of living of each party" when determining an alimony award.
Jensen at ^[9. A major element of a party's standard of living involves the mortgage or rent
of the residence. It stands to reason, then, that part of the judge's efforts to equalize the
parties' lifestyles would include rendering a decision that affords similar residences to each
party.

As the aforementioned cases demonstrate, Loren's claim that the trial court

incorrectly determined Paige's need in calculating the alimony is mistaken.

When

considering the threshold described in ASC Utah. Inc. the very merits of Loren's argument
are questionable and ought to be dismissed by this Court.
This Court's determination in Christiansen parallels the current matter. Loren
consistently made a sizeable income for many years, but failed to properly maintain his
marital residence, choosing to use his extra money on hunting instead. Paige's testimony
states that, "I worked to pay for the kids to do their horses and stuff, and he worked, and the
extra money he had went for him to go hunt—hunting and fishing." Tr. at 54. As an
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example, Paige specifically cites a time when they were going to replace their windows,
explaining that instead, "[h]e went bear hunting with the window money." Tr. at 53. In his
brief, Loren erroneously attempts to describe this funneling of money to hunting instead of
house repairs as a joint decision, stating that, "[d]uring their entire marriage, the parties
consciously chose to neglect the home and spend their discretionary income on hunting
expenses." Brief ofAppellant at 6. Both Paige's testimony and the fact that Loren's paychecks
were always deposited into a savings account that did not have Paige's name on it rebut that
claim. Tr. at p. 16. Describing the parties' decisions about discretionary money as consensual
is misleading since Paige did not even have access to the money.
To insist that the dilapidated state of the marital residence is a standard of living Paige
"enjoyed" during her marriage and should be held to afterwards would be a gross
misapplication of the precedent established by Utah courts. Christiansen stands for the
proposition that a husband cannot neglect the needs of his family when maintaining the
ability to care for them, and then expect to keep them at such low standard of living when he
causes the breakup of the family.

Loren ignores entirely in his brief, and fails to challenge

the trial court's finding that the trial court faulted Loren for creating such a low standard of
living in the first place, particularly given his nearly $6000 per month income, indicating that
he may have let the home fall into disrepair due to "his romantic interest in another
woman." Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law at p. 5.
The case law and statutes regarding alimony as argued supra seek to prevent either
party from abusing the system in their efforts to punish the other. Trying to emulate the
standard of living when the parties were still married is one method of trying to establish a
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fair way of allocating the resources of the marriage after its dissolution. This method is not
flawless, and hence, courts are directed to "consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles" when determining alimony amounts.
Further, the trial court specifically found that the marital residence was not a fit place
for the minor child to reside and specifically faulted Loren that it was in such a state. They
equalized the parties' standard of living by awarding Paige a residence worth $140,000 and
awarding Loren the marital residence that would be worth the same as Paige's residence
once the repairs were made. In Jensen it states that one of the purposes of alimony is to
equalize the parties' standard of living, and this is exacdy what the trial court has done in this
matter. The parties have been placed on equal footing. The court awarded Paige alimony
that included an award of $710 for a mortgage payment on a $140,000 house and awarded
Loren the marital residence that appraised at $68,000 but with $70,000 of repair would place
him on equal footing with Paige in having a residence worth about $140,000. Thus, based
on the statute and case law above the trial court did not err when it awarded Paige alimony
that would allow her to maintain a $140,000 mortgage, k simply placed the parties on equal
footing.
II.

T H E EVIDENCE SUPPORTS T H E TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
OF FACT.
*

In his Brief Loren argues that there was no evidence presented to the trial court on
certain findings of fact made by the trial court. These issues specifically included the value
of the marital residence and its land, that Loren was to be faulted for letting the house go
into disrepak, that Loren could make the necessary repaks, that Paige could find a suitable
home with horse property for $140,000, and how the amount of $70,000 was reached for
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making repairs to the marital home. Brief ofAppellant at p. 10. Loren is incorrect in making
this argument.
In Reed v. Reed, the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
The district court's findings of fact are based upon a judgment of the
credibility of the witnesses. It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the
credibility of witnesses, and we will not second-guess the trial court where
there is a reasonable basis to support its findings. In order to challenge the
court's findings of fact, the defendant must marshal all of the evidence in
favor of the findings and then demonstrate that even when reviewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. Defendant has not shouldered the burden
necessary to overturn the findings of the trial court.
Ibid., 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991)(footnote omitted). However, the marshaling standard
has recently been changed as is set forth in Kimball v. Kimball as follows:
... [T]he marshaling doctrine, now recognized in our rules, see UTAH R.APP. P.
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding."), requires that counsel identify
which particular findings are challenged as lacking adequate evidentiary
support and then show the court why that is so. This can only logically be
done by summarizing, or "marshaling," whatever evidence there is that
supports each challenged finding. We emphasize that only the supportive
evidence is legally relevant and is all that counsel should call our
attention to. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 U T App 189, | 1 2 , 51 P.3d 724 ("[A]n
exhaustive or voluminous recitation of all the facts presented at trial, even if
this recitation includes within its body the facts that support the challenged
ruling, is not what is expected."), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
Ibid., 2009 U T App. 233, fn. 5, 217 P.3d 733 (emphasis added). Furthermore, UT R. EVID.
201(b) states that, "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." Under Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., this
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Court acknowledged that Rule 201 authorized it to take judicial notice on appeal. Ibid,, 758
P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App. 1988).
This Court has explained that the proper method of marshaling evidence in an appeal
is to play the "devil's advocate," which requires an appellant to "present the evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light
favorable to their case." Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham. 2008 UT App. 207,
1J12, 186 P.3d 1012, citing Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, f78, 100 P.3d 1177. In Reed, the
Utah Supreme Court likewise states that the standard for marshaling should be high enough
that "even when reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Ibid, at 1184. An underlying assumption in
reviewing the evidence in a favorable light to the trial court's findings is the credibility of the
testimonies given. Unless the judge indicated otherwise during the trial, the testimonies given
in it are credible. See Kimball at ^31.
For instance, Loren's brief purports to have marshaled the evidence against the trial
court's finding that the marital residence was in a state of disrepair, but then claims that there
was no evidence provided at trial that the house actually was in disrepair. Brief of Appellee at
10. When a challenge is made that "no evidence" exists to support a contention so as to
absolve the marshaling requirement, only a scintilla of evidence must be shown to exist to
defeat the contention. See Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management. 2005 UT App 430, TJ20,
124 P.3d 269, citing Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22, T[25, 112 P.3d 495. The most
comprehensive evidence given at the trial about the house's condition was that of Paige's
testimony that states as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
16 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I have a section of roof that leaked last winter of 2009, 2010, a section that fell
down. [. . .] And the drywall is still hanging down. It needs a total bathroom
redo. The handles weren't fixed right, and it's—I had to replace one handle so
I could have hot water. When the guy came to help me do that, he had to get
it from the back of the wall, he said there's mold issues in the wall, that that
wall at least needs to be taken out and redone because how Kelly had fixed it
had sucked the wall in, and it had taken the grout off from the tub, so the
water had got in there and damaged it. It needs new doors, new window, and
that's just like the things that need to be done right this minute.
Tr. at 51-52. It should be noted that Paige's counsel tried to submit an appraisal on home
repairs, but Loren's counsel objected on the account of hearsay and so the appraisal was not
entered on the record. Ibid, at 20. The trial court's ruling, however, demonstrated that the
judge found Paige's testimony to be credible, especially since Loren did not present
contradicting evidence at trial. Reed states that, "it is the province of the trier of fact to
assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will not second-guess the trial court where there is
a reasonable basis to support its findings." Id. at 1184. Loren fails to provide rebuttal
evidence to Paige's having his own appraisal conducted.
Furthermore, with regards to the other findings that Loren argues have not been
supported by sufficient evidence, the trial court made such determinations regarding the
repairs to the home, the amount they would cost, and whether Loren was capable of making
such repairs based upon the trial court's judgment of the credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses and other methods that cannot be reasonably disputed. This leaves a reasonable
basis for this Court to believe that its findings are not reasonably disputed and to leave such
findings intact.

The trial court relied upon the testimony of the parties and common

knowledge to make a determination in its findings in this matter, thus, there is no reasonable
reason for such findings to be disputed and they should remain in tact.
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III.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
APPROPRIATELY
INCLUDED
HISTORICAL
EXPENSES
RESPECTING
THE
FAMILY'S
ANIMALS I N ITS ALIMONY AWARD.

In his brief Loren argues that the amount of $200 for the horses and stock animals as
part of Paige's expenses should not have been considered when calculating the alimony
award for two reasons: (a) the animals belong to the minor child; and (b) because the
alimony award will last for twenty-two (22) years—the duration of the marriage—and the
minor child will come of age in only five (5) years, leaving Loren to pay for such expenses
when the minor child reaches the age of majority and goes to college. Brief ofAppellant at p.
14.
In Bushell v. BushelL the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
A trial judge has wide discretion in dividing property and in providing for
alimony and custody and his judgment will not be disturbed absent a showing
of an abuse of discretion. Division of property: Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d
166, 442 P.2d 928 (1968); Alimony: Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421
P.2d 503 (1966); Custody: Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.2d 510 (1979). Our
review of the record reveals ample evidence upon which the trial judge could
have based his judgment.
Ibid., 649 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1982). See also Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373,1J25, 993
P.2d 887 {quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ^[16, 987 P.2d 603). In Boyce v.
Goble it states as follows:
To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must
first show that a substantial material change of circumstance has occurred
"'since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself."
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, Tfll, 997 P.2d 903 (emphasis omitted)
(citations omitted); accord Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ^[8, 983
P.2d 1103. "The change in circumstance required to justify a modification of
the decree of divorce varies with the type of modification contemplated.
Provisions in the original decree of divorce granting alimony, child support,
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and the like must be readily susceptible to alteration at a later date...." Foulger v.
Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).
Ibid., 2000 UT App 237,1fl4, 8 P.3d 1042.
In the instant matter, the trial court used its discretion in providing alimony for Paige
and in doing so equalized the parties' standard of living. It took into consideration the feed
and supplies that would be needed for the horses and the stock animals that were historically
paid for by the parties and to enable the child to earn money towards her college education.
Loren however, is arguing that he should not have to pay this expense in the form of
alimony for twenty-two (22) years but only until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen
(18), which is in about five (5) more years. Loren disputes that such expenses should not be
in the form of alimony.
What Loren does not mention is that the horses will likely continue as Paige's
responsibility after the child reaches the age of majority and goes away to college, and it will
continue to be an expense included in Paige's standard of living, which has always been a
historical expense of the family's. Thus, for the $200 to be included in the expenses when
calculating the alimony award was not an error on the part of the trial court.
The parties historically paid to feed the horses and other animals prior to the parties'
separation just as household expenses include caring of any type of family pet. Including it
as an expense of Paige's, which it reasonably is, is simply keeping the parties in the standard
of living to which they are accustomed. Loren has failed to adequately challenge how this
type of expense is somehow an exception when calculating parties needs to equalize the
standards of living for an overall award of alimony.
Additionally, the award of alimony was not afforded particular to certain expenses.
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Loren argues that the $200 somehow was completely afforded to him in the alimony award;
however, this is simply untrue. It was included as an expense, just as the vehicle, mortgage,
utilities, etc. Loren is not writing out a check each month to the place which they obtain the
necessary items with which to support the animals. The alimony award is to ensure that
Paige enjoys the same standard of living Loren should have provided during the marriage—
although the trial court faulted him for not doing so and frivolously spending his excess
income on less important things than his family's needs. Loren's argument fails in that the
trial court's award was not specific to any specific expenses and thus it may have determined
that Paige incurred the total cost of caring for the animals while Loren was required to assist
with the basic necessities. Alimony is a totality argument that Loren has failed to address
entirely and it is clear that the equalizing of the parties' standards of living through the
alimony award has not worked a manifest injustice on Loren in this regard.
Furthermore, Loren appears to be arguing what may become a change of
circumstances with regards to alimony somewhere in the future, but which does not now
exist. Presumed changes in the future should be dealt with when the presumption becomes
reality. A trial court cannot conceivably enter an award based on all possible changes that
may come in the future, hence the ability to seek modifications when such arise. Loren
should not be afforded relief on what he perceives to be a change that might occur in five (5)
years.

[Remainder of page left intentionally blank]
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this
Court grant Paige the relief which she requests and any further relief that this Court deems
necessary.
DATED this 4th day of October, 2011.

McKette H. Alked
Attorney for Paige Farnsworth
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on this 4th day of October 2011, I sent by first-class mail,
postage-prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above Brief'of'Appellee to the following:
Mr. Samuel P. Chiara
Mr. Don M. Torgerson
CHIARA & TORGERSON, PLLC
453 East Main St., Ste. 100
P.O. Box, 955, Price, UT 84501

21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

